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ABSTRACT 
Maqasid al-Shari’a is a term that is widely used nowadays in the field of Islamic law. 
However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of 
Egypt, in its interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, started endorsing the 
maqasid as a framework through which it conceptualizes the application of Islamic law. 
Also, with Islamists and religious figures using the maqasid as a framework to use reason 
and adopt the traditional Islamic jurisprudence to the modern contexts, it is essential to 
trace how the classical theory of maqasid was developed and what are the constituents of 
that theory. This paper, accordingly, traces the classical theory of maqasid versus how it 
has been used since the ‘revival’ of the theory in the late 19th century by Rashid Rida. 
Accordingly, with such investigation of the roots of the theory and how the classical 
jurists conceptualized its application, this paper analyzes the SCC’s use of maqasid to 
demonstrate how the maqasid was a tool used by the court to mediate between different 
political actors, specifically between the militant Islamists in the 1990s and the secular 
government.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Examining almost any of the cases of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) 
that are related to Islamic law or Shari’a1, one would encounter the term “maqasid al-
Shari’a” or the goals of the Shari’a as part of its reasoning. Thus, digging more behind 
what the maqasid are, or the doctrine of maqasid is, one would be overwhelmed by the 
amount of literature on the topic. What is interesting, is that the literature on maqasid is 
either classical, so from around the eleventh century till the fifteenth century, or from the 
late nineteenth century onwards. However, the interest in the doctrine of maqasid in the 
second half of the twentieth century is intriguing, where the published literature on 
maqasid is massive. 
 The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed the intense use of the 
doctrine of maqasid al-Shari’a by multiple players, the most important of which is the 
Egyptian SCC starting the 1990’s. Other significant key players who intensely write on 
maqasid and encourage the revival of the doctrine are modernist Islamic reformers. 
While both the SCC judges and Islamic reformers employ the doctrine of maqasid, they 
do so differently, and for different goals. The SCC judges in Egypt, use the maqasid, 
amongst other tools, as a ‘semblance of Islamicty’2 as a means to evade the traditional 
jurisprudence, while maintaining the freedom of legislation from having to commit or 
adhere to the traditional jurisprudence in Islamic law, where in some cases they could 
even contradict it. By Islamicity, I mean that judges of the SCC use the doctrine of the 
maqasid, and its technical terminology, to demonstrate their respect for classical Islamic 
law theories, and their utilization of such a classical theory as cornerstone in the 
jurisprudence of the court. 
 The doctrine of maqasid al-Shari’a was developed by classical jurists to escape 
the rigidity of the tradition, abuses of the law, and as a tool in order to grant jurists the 
                                                            
1 I like to use Ziba Mir- Hosseini’s distinction between shari’a and fiqh in her article “The Construction of 
Gender in Islamic Legal Thought and Startegies for Reform,” where she explains that “. . . shari’a is the 
totality of God’s law as revealed to the Prophet,” while “. . . fiqh is the legal science which aims to discern 
and extract sharia legal rules from Qur’an and sunna….it has its legal theories and methodologies.’ 
2 Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family law: The Case of Egypt, at 1050. 
2 
 
space for more subjectivity and interaction with the sacred texts in order to meet the 
needs of the new contexts.3 The ‘re’interest in maqasid started in the late 19th Century 
through the discussion of the concept of al-maslaha al-‘ammah or public benefit by 
Mohammed ‘Abdu and even more so by his disciple Mohammed Rashid Rida. Rida 
argued for the importance of the use of the concept of maslaha in legislation and put forth 
some criteria or a methodology for such use.4 Rida’s discussion could be argued to be the 
spark for the resurgence or revival of the classical doctrine of maqasid. Accordingly, 
many religious scholars, political actors, reformers and then legalists, endorsed the 
doctrine of the maqasid in multiple ways to advocate for different purposes. 
Although the literature on maqasid is huge, especially literature encouraging its 
use as the primary framework for modern ‘Islamic’ legislation, it is remarkably intriguing 
that there is almost no scholarly work5 analyzing the SCC’s endorsement and use of the 
theory. In addition, it is interesting to investigate how religious scholars classically 
perceived how the theory should be applied, how modern reformers elaborate on the 
theory and how they expect it to be used, versus how the SCC conceptualizes it. Thus, 
with the prominence of the theory of maqasid in most contemporary religious scholarly 
work, and with calls for its adoption as the foundational methodology to come up with 
new religious rulings (ahkam) that are compatible with the modern context, it is essential 
to see how the very same methodology is employed by the SCC judges to pass its 
political choices. The maqasid is perceived to be the sound methodology for adapting 
Shari’a to the modern context by both religious scholars and reformers, as well as the 
SCC judges since unlike other methods, like talfiq, employed by the court, the maqasid is 
a classical tool that was developed by classical jurists. According to the scholar Wael 
Hallaq, it is “accurate to argue that any serious project aiming at refashioning a 
conception of Shari’a must claim history and pre-modern legal culture as its frame of 
                                                            
3 Mohammad H. Kamali. "maqāṣid al-sharī'ah": The objectives of islamic law. Islamic Studies, 38(2), 198. 
4 Clark B. Lombardi; Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human 
Rights - How Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 Am. U. 
Int'l L. Rev. 379, 436 (2005-2006), at 10. 
5 The only exception here is Nathan Brown & Clark Lombardi’s article Supra note 4; and Clark Lombardi’s 
book State law as Islamic law in modern Egypt: the incorporation of the Sharīʻa into Egyptian 
constitutional law (2006). 
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reference.”6 This is arguably true because it provides the new/modern arguments with the 
outlook of the classical jurisprudence which is perceived by many to be the true and 
authentic Shari’a. As a result, it is essential to investigate how such a classical tool is 
refashioned in the modern context to meet the expectations of its endorsers.  
Accordingly, this paper argues that the doctrine of maqasid al-Shari’a is often 
used by the SCC judges in a manner that is deviant from the classical methodology as a 
tool of mediation between different political actors. In other words, in circumstances 
where the court was faced with multiple pressures, from either the secular government or 
the militant Islamists in the 1990’s, the court employed the maqasid as one of its tools to 
mediate between the different political actors. Moreover, by endorsing the terminology of 
the maqasid, the court maintained the outlook of its choice to adhere to Islamic law, as 
the public was expecting. On the other hand, the maqasid, as a classical liberating tool, 
was the court’s leeway, or ‘Islamic framework’ under which it managed to support 
secular legislation.  
Chapter I of this paper chronicles the history of the maqasid theory, its classical 
conceptualization and evolution and its resurgence and development in the 20th Century 
as a prominent theory. Chapter II attempts at giving a detailed historical and political 
background of the SCC, and when and how it endorses the theory of maqasid. Finally, 
chapter III includes the discussion and analysis of two prominent SCC cases, where the 
maqasid was used as an integral part of the court’s reasoning.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Wael B Hallaq, Maqasid and the Challenges of Modernity, 49 Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 1 – 31 
(2011), at 2. 
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                                      II. MAQASID AL-SHARI’A 
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section will focus on giving a thorough 
account of the classical theory of maqasid and its contextual background in order for the 
reader to have the foundation of the classical theory when the discussion proceeds with 
how SCC uses the theory in later chapters. Then, the second section will proceed with 
when and how the theory was revived in the late nineteenth century and twentieth 
century. In other words, it will explore how the ‘modernists’ perceived the theory and 
refashioned it to their contexts. The discussion will include a number of key figures that 
were influential in the proliferation and endorsement of the theory of maqasid like 
Mohamed Rashid Rida, Sanhuri and how it could be argued that he used the maqasid in a 
covert form, and other influential figures like Mohamed al-Tahir Ibn ‘Ashur, Youssef al-
Qaradawi. Finally, this chapter aims at familiarizing the reader with the technical 
terminology that is related to the maqasid theory. 
A. Historical and Contextual Background 
1. Classical Methodologies: al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi 
The amount of classical literature on maqasid is huge where many prominent jurists have 
engaged with the theory and wrote about it at length. For example, scholars like al-
Qarafi, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayim have all written about maqasid.7 However, the 
focus in this paper, and this section, will be solely on the main contributors or developers 
of the theory. 
Maqasid al-Shari’a are simply the aims/goals or (higher) objectives of Shari’a or 
Islamic law.8 The goals that the theory refers to is what jurists perceived could be 
achieved by the process of induction from the scriptural sources in order to promote a 
certain benefit (sing. maslaha, plur. masalih) or to prevent a result that would cause harm 
(darar). The doctrine of maqasid was developed over a long period of time and many 
prominent scholars have contributed to its development.9  
                                                            
7 Yūsuf Qaraḍāwī, Dirāsah fī fiqh maqāsịd al-sharīʻah: bayna al-maqāsịd al-kullīyah wa-al-nusụ̄s ̣al-juzʼīyah 
(al-Tạbʻah 1 ed. 2006) at 12. 
8 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation, 2008, at 59-70. 
9 Id. at 193. 
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In order to understand the reasons for the prominence of the theory of maqasid, it is 
essential to dedicate a brief section on the ‘pre-maqasid’ era as well as the contextual 
background of the formative period when the theory was developed.  
Pre-maqasid Era 
In al-Risala, which is considered to be the first work on Islamic legal theory (usul al-
fiqh), al-Shafi’i articulated a theory through which “he specifies and prescribes the 
methods by which laws are formulated.”10 Shafi’i was concerned with establishing a 
theory that based the methodologies, through which the law is discovered, in the divine 
texts.11 Moreover, Shafi’i was preoccupied with establishing and justifying how the 
Qur’an, Prophetic Sunna, consensus (ijma’) and qiyas were the authoritative sources of 
law. More specifically, Shafi’i was aiming at justifying “the authoritative bases of, first, 
the Sunna, and, second, consensus and qiyas.”12 Shafi’i’s theory or methodological 
framework of usul al-fiqh greatly restricted the use of ijtihad by scholars and had limited 
ijtihad to qiyas, which is analogical reasoning, to argue against the traditionalists at that 
time who “spurned reason as a means of expounding the law.”1314 Moreover, Shafi’i, 
amongst other scholars, were countering a tendency, that had already become prevalent at 
that time, of ignoring Prophetic reports and claiming that when the Qur’an is silent on an 
issue, human reason would become the final judge.15   
However, by time, Shafi’i’ came to be known as the master and founder of usul a-
fiqh, and his methodology was adopted by the other juristic guilds or madhahib (Hanafi, 
Hanbali and Maliki) and the use of reason and ijtihad became greatly limited by the 
sources of law that Shafi’i put forth.16 Thus, from the time of Shafi’i’s theory, which is 
around the second/eighth century till the sixth/twelfth century, there were no new theories 
or methodologies that would give jurists the authority to engage with the scriptures the 
                                                            
10 Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni usul al-fiqh, 1997, at 21. 
11 Id. at 22. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Supra note 8, at 44-7. 
15 Supra note 10, at 21. 
16 Supra note 8, at 61. 
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way maqasid did.17 Accordingly, with taqlid being the norm, the expression of the 
“Closure of the Gates of Ijtihad” was coined to reflect the restriction on ijtihad.  
Closure of the Gates of Ijtihad 
It is debated as whether there was such a thing as the “Closure of the Gates of 
Ijtihad,”18 where the jurisprudential tradition was inclined towards restricting jurists to 
following (imitating) the existing juristic opinions rather than doing ijtihad. Ijtihad, in 
broad terms, is the process through which jurists identify rulings (ahkam) directly from 
the Qur’an and hadith literature.19 Many scholars argue that taqlid or imitation, rather 
than engagement with the scriptural texts had become the norm for centuries after Imam 
Shafi’i came up with his theory of the sources of law, usul al-fiqh. On the other hand, 
several scholars have pointed out that the “Closure of the Gates of Ijtihad” is a legal 
fiction that was developed by the guilds (madhahib) arguing that there were “no longer 
‘independent’ mujtahids [jurists who can perform ijtihad] that were sufficiently skilled in 
textual scholarship to derive rulings in every case through ijtihad.”20 Accordingly, jurists 
were forced or driven by necessity to “work from the established precedents laid down by 
earlier mujtahids.”21 However, arguing against these arguments, some scholars have 
advocated that the move to taqlid maintained the jurists control or hegemony over the 
interpretation of Shari’a from possible competition.22 As taqlid tended to restrict the 
interpretive subjectivity and discretion of jurists, some have also argued that it was a 
mechanism through which fiqh was made more stable in order to feasibly become the law 
or the state or caliphate.23  
The Formative Period of the Maqasid: al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali 
The fifth/eleventh century is associated with the most extensive record of works on 
legal theory.24 It is in the fifth/eleventh century that many legal problems of legal theory 
start being addressed, and also “some of the most creative and brilliant legal theorists 
                                                            
17 Id. 
18 Supra note 12 at 41. . 
19Id. at 40. 
20 Id. at 41. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Supra note 10 at 36. 
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(usulists) of Islam” produce their works. One of the essential players in the formative 
period of the maqasid is the Shafi’iite scholar Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni 
(d.478/1085). Al-Juwayni’s main contribution to the maqasid was in fact indirect; his 
main contribution in that period was coming closer to the Greek philosophical tradition 
and introducing logic to usul al-fiqh.25 It was Juwayni’s student, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, 
who is considered seminal to that era for making “clean break, at least in theory, with the 
established tradition and incorporating” Greek logic and philosophical principles such as 
the Aristotelian theory of definition, and introduced such principles in his works.26 
Moreover, it is during that period that al-Ghazali elaborated on the theory of maqasid, 
and presented a thorough discussion of it and its underlying principle of maslaha. 
Al-Ghazali argued that the ultimate aims (maqasid) of the law are the “constant and 
consistent promotion of benefit [maslaha] and exclusion of harm [darrar].”27However, 
Ghazali believed that aims of the law are numerous and multi-faceted. Thus, he divided 
the maqasid in three categories.28 The first category included the aims of the law that are 
considered indispensable (darurat), where he lists five (sub)-categories/aims which are 
the protection of life (nafs), private property (al-mal), mind (al-‘aql), offspring/progeny 
(al-nasl) and religion (al-din). The second level consists of aims that are considered 
necessary (hajiyyat). These aims in the second category are “distinguished from the first 
in that the neglect of the indispensable aims causes severe harm to life, property mind, 
etc., whereas aims classified as belonging to the second levels are needed for maintaining 
an orderly society properly governed by the law."29 The third category includes those 
aims that Ghazali labels “improvements” (tahsin), which basically “enhance the 
implementation of the aims of the law.”30 
 Maslaha and al-Masalih al-Mursala 
                                                            
25 Id. at 39. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 89. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 90. 
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Istislah is reasoning on the basis of maslaha or public interest.31 One of the methods of 
inferring the ratio legis (‘illa) of a certain scriptural text is suitability (munasaba).32 
Ghazali vehemently defends this method of inferring the ratio of a scriptural text which is 
not explicitly stated, and argues that the “ultimate goal of suitability is . . . the protection 
of public interest (maslaha) in accordance with the fundamental principles of the law.”33  
Accordingly, due to the “relationship between the ration and suitability that maslaha  
[and istislah] . . . is deemed an extension of qiyas, and thus most works of legal theory do 
not devote to it an independent section . . .”34  
 An issue that arises in the context of istislah is that of “cases whose rules are 
derived on the basis of a rationally suitable benefit that is not sustained by textual 
evidence. This is called al-masalih al-mursala”35 In other words, such benefits are not 
defined by a scriptural text, but rather rationally, and subjectively, defined by the jurist. 
Most jurists refused to accept any conclusions that were not based on a scriptural text 
even if they were advancing public interest.36 Ghazali, however, has a rather interesting 
argument about al-masalih al-mursala, where he argued that “[i]f the feature of public 
interest in a case can be defined as serving any of these principles [the principles of 
protecting life, private property, etc.], and if it can be shown to be certain (qat’i) and 
universal (kulli), then reasoning in accordance with it is deemed valid.” Universality here 
is meant to ensure that the use of this type of reasoning would lead to the protection of 
the interests of the Muslim community as a whole and not cater to the desires of a 
specific group.37  
Al-Shatibi: Social Context  
The discussion of Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388) and his development of the theory 
of maqasid in al-Muwafaqat is perhaps the most important in our account of the classical 
theory of maqasid.  Shatibi is closely associated with the doctrine of maqasid since his 
elaboration and development of the theory “represented the culmination of an intellectual 
                                                            
31 Id at 112. 
32 Id. at 88. 
33 Id. at 89. 
34 Id. at 112. 
35 Id at 112. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
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development that started as early as the fourth/tenth century." It is argued that Shatibi’s 
development of the theory of maqasid was primarily his reaction to address the different 
social contexts taking place in eighth/fourteenth century Andalusia.38Hallaq argues that 
Shatibi’s theory, “for all its ingenuity and novel character” was aiming to restore the  
"true law of Islam, a law which he thought was adulterated by two extreme 
practices in his day, namely, the lax attitudes of the jurisconsults and, far more 
importantly, the excessive legal demands imposed by what seems to have been 
the majority of contemporary Sufis, in whose ranks must have been a certain 
population of legal scholars. . . A careful reading of his works al-Muwafaqat and 
al-I'tisam, demonstrate that the main motive behind his theories was attacking the 
Mystics of his time, who seemed to have been a powerful force propagating what 
he perceived as a rigid and unduly demanding application of the law.”39  
 
Thus, the background that Shatibi reacts to, of perceiving the law as being abused by 
different (legal) actors and accordingly leading to its failure, becomes relatable to the 
modern reformers like Rashid Rida when they face the new challenges of modernity. In 
other words, they (modernist Islamist reformers) see in Shatibi, and the challenges of his 
context, a similarity with the challenges they face of adapting the law to the new modern 
context. Accordingly, this led to Shatibi, and his legal theory of maqasid, playing an 
integral role in the modern reform movement.40 
Shatibi’s Methodology 
Shatibi uses Ghazali’s categories of maqasid of darurat, hajiyyat and tahsiniyat as 
foundations to his theory and thus builds his theory on what Ghazali had put forth.41Thus, 
Shatibi also views that "the existential purpose of the Shari’a to be the protection and 
promotion of [those] three legal categories.”42 Shatibi, like most theorists, conforms to 
the idea that certitude is the epistemic foundation of the different sources of the law.43 
However, Shatibi additionally makes the argument/postulate that the fundamental 
premises (muqaddimat) of legal theory are also certain.44 The premises that Shatibi 
                                                            
38 Id. at 162. 
39 Id at 163. 
40 Id. at 162-3. 
41 Id. at 169. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 164. 
44 Id. at 165. 
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address are certain whether they are rational, revelational or conventional.45 However, 
more specifically, the revelational premises are considered to be certain due to the fact 
that their “meaning is unequivocal and because they have been transmitted, either 
through recurrent thematic reports (tawatur ma'nawi) or through recurrent verbal reports 
(tawatur lafzi) . . .” or through an “exhaustive inductive survey of the entirety of Shar'i 
material."46 
 Unlike other theorists, the epistemic foundations of Shatibi’s theory are based on 
“comprehensive inductive surveys of relevant evidence” and not on any specific 
Prophetic reports or Qur’anic verses.47 In other words, the evidence that Shatibi’s theory 
is based on, could be textual or non-textual. Thus, Shatibi proposes that the "truly reliable 
premises . . . are those that have been culled through a broad inductive survey of a large 
number of probable pieces of evidence all sharing one theme, so large in fact that their 
totality they yield certitude.”48 Accordingly, the five pillars of Islam, such as prayer and 
pilgrimage, are identified with certainty to be obligatory through such a survey of 
different (textual and non-textual) pieces of evidence.49 Thus, the focus in Shatibi’s 
theory is not based on the certainty of the various premises but rather the common theme 
that is shared by the different and relevant material.50 Shatibi's method of “evidential 
corroboration” resembles that of the "multiply transmitted Prophetic reports of the 
thematic kind (tawatur ma'nawi).”51 However, the material that Shatibi's inductive 
corroboration draws on such as the Qur'an, Sunna, consensus, qiyas and contextual 
evidence (qara'in al-ahwal) is much more diverse than just Prophetic reports.52 
Accordingly, when a large, or sufficient,  number of pieces of evidence are found to 
support or confirm a specific “idea, notion, or principle, the knowledge of that idea or 
principle becomes engendered in the mind with certainty because the confluence of 
evidence has the effect of virtually complete, if not perfect, inductive corroboration”. 
                                                            
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
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This demonstrates how when attempting to identify a maqsid (aim), Shatibi prescribed a 
methodology of collecting all the different pieces of evidence that support a common 
theme. In other words, a jurist cannot simply claim that a certain concept is an aim of the 
law without actually going through the inductive survey that Shatibi prescribes and thus 
having the sufficient evidence to prove his claim. However, that does not imply that 
Shatibi’s method did not open the door for subjectivism; this is demonstrated by how his 
theory became the cornerstone of the modernist Islamist (reformist) utilitarianism.  
Critique and Reactions to al-Shatibi’s Theory 
As mentioned earlier, Shatibi’s main motive for the development of his theory was to 
counter the forces of the two different legal players at his time: the Sufis, for the rigidity, 
and the jurisconsults, for their extreme leniency and lack of a sound and coherent 
methodology. Accordingly, he was critiqued and accused with several accusations that 
we know of from his book al-I’tisam where he refutes some of the accusations of the 
jurists.53 For instance, Shatibi was accused of being “stringent in his legal views, 
demanding the application of laws that lead to hardship."54 Shatibi however defends 
himself by clarifying the reason for such accusations are due to his ""commitment to 
issue legal opinions in conformity with the dominant and widely accepted (mashhur) 
doctrines in our [Malikite] school . . . But they do transgress the limits of the school's 
doctrines no issues legal opinions that deviate from the mashhur, opinions agreeable to 
the people and their pleasures.""55 This defense is very interesting since it shows how 
Shatibi although was proposing an arguably novel methodology or theory, he was also 
defending being bound to a specific doctrine (madhab) and attacking/criticizing the 
jurisconsults for their inconsistent and incoherent ways of issuing opinions. Thus, Shatibi 
was not revolting against the traditional or classical legal theory or methodology as a 
whole, but rather defending it. However, he was proposing a methodology that, if used 
consistently and coherently in the manner that he prescribed, would make the law more 
adaptable to new contexts. 
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Shatibi was also accused of animosity towards Sufis and that he preached against their 
practices, which he viewed as heretic and not following the example of the Prophet.56 
Moreover, he was accused of "deviating from the religious community (jama'a)." 57 
However, Shatibi defends himself by clarifying that the community which is to be 
followed, is that which adheres to the Prophetic example and that of the companions, and 
thus it is a matter of the "quality of practices prevailing in society" that counts, rather 
than just a matter of the size of the community or number of people.58 In other words, he 
defends the Sufi’s accusations of his deviation from the religious community (jama'a), 
which was highly controlled or dominated by Sufis, by arguing that their understanding 
of the jama’a is flawed, where it is not the number of people in the jama’a that matters 
but rather the quality of the practices prevalent amongst them. Shatibi here is obviously 
twisting the prevalent understanding the jama’a by stressing on the quality of jurists or 
their practices rather than the quantity or number of jurists. 
 
2. Modern ‘Reconceptualization’ of Maqasid al-Shari’a 
The modern literature on maqasid is massive. The literature on maqasid can be divided in 
three categories: Scholarship which discusses the origins of the maqasid; Scholarship 
which advocates the use of maqasid as a modern tool for legislation and lastly; 
Scholarship that critiques the maqasid as a classical tool to be applied nowadays, which 
is very little.   
 
i. Mohamed Rashid Rida 
As mentioned earlier, Mohamed Rashid Rida could be credited for the resurgence or 
revival of the theory of maqasid in the 20th Century, by elaborating on the theory 
systematically. Like his mentor, Rida rejected the system of taqlid and advocated for the 
return to ijtihad and the engagement with the scriptural sources.59 Rida was occupied 
with the need to Islamic legislation that would be compatible with the needs and context 
of the modern world, in the first half of the 20th Century. As a result, Rida systematically 
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published extracts from works of al-Shatibi in the periodical al-Manar. In addition, 
believing in al-Shatibi’s theories, he later edited and published his book al-’I‘tissam in 
1913/1914.60 
  Accordingly, Rida articulated a methodology of ijtihad that was based on utility, 
which Clark Lombardi elaborately labels “utilitarian neo-ijtihad.”61 Rida thus proposed: 
1) Identifying the rules and goals of the Shari’a; and 2) Developing codifiable state 
legislation that served the public interest, without violating the established rules and goals 
of the Shari’a.62 In other words, Rida was proposing that modern states, that wanted to 
have Shari’a applied in its legal systems, did not need to ask their legislators to derive 
rules from the existing classical tradition of fiqh.63 Moreover, he asserted that, unlike the 
tradition in fiqh, states are required to respect exclusively the rulings (ahkam) that were 
absolutely certain (qat‘i) with respect to both their authenticity (thubutiha) and meaning 
(dalalatiha).64 By this new proposition, Rida departed from the tradition, where classical 
jurists had looked for rules that were either certain or probable (zanni) with respect to 
their authenticity or meaning.65 In addition, whereas classically jurists had to respect 
uncertain rulings on which there had been binding consensus (’ijma‘) , Rida, following a 
minority opinion, argued that only the consensus of the Prophet and companions could be 
considered binding and thus establish the certainty, and universality, of such rulings .66 
 The issue of the certainty (qat‘i) and uncertainty (zanni) with respect to the 
authenticity and meaning of a text is important to clarify since it is an essential part in the 
SCC cases, and it is Rida who influenced how the SCC respects only the scriptural texts 
(pl. nusus, sing. nass) that are certain with respect to both authenticity and meaning.67 A 
text that is qat‘i with respect to both authenticity and meaning, “left the reader with 
absolute certainty about what God wanted them to do. . . [and] they provided the reader 
with rulings that were “absolutely certain” to be rulings of the Shari’a.”68 Below the 
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absolutely certain came three other categories of revealed texts: texts that were certain 
with respect to their authenticity, but probable with respect to their meaning (qat‘i al-
thubut wa zanni al-dalalah) like certain Qur’anic verses whose meanings were not 
certain; texts that were probable with respect to the authenticity (zanni al-thubut wa qat‘i 
al-dalalah), but certain with respect to their meaning like certain hadiths; and finally texts 
that were probable with respect to both their authenticity and meaning (zanni al-thubut 
wa zanni al-dalalah).69 Before Rida’s proposal, jurists accepted rulings from the second 
and third categories to be valid and thus binding rulings of the Shari’a unless there was a 
contradiction with other epistemologically more valid or secure evidence. Thus, this 
shows how Rida, wanting to free legislation from what he perceived as the rigidity and 
‘shackles’ of the tradition, opened the door for legislators to not follow except a limited 
number of scriptural commands through his extremely high benchmark for what 
constituted a scriptural command that states had to respect.  
 As mentioned earlier in the section discussing Shatibi’s theory of maqasid, 
Shatibi was not concerned with the certainty of the premises; however, he was concerned 
with the thematic evidence that existed through various pieces of evidence regardless of 
their certainty. Thus, in the inductive corroborative survey, probable pieces of evidence 
could be used if found to support the same theme as other pieces of evidence. This 
demonstrates how Rida departs even from Shatibi’s theorization of the certainty of texts 
and their importance in his theory of maqasid.  
 Rida highly encouraged the use of maslaha, and utilitarian reasoning in general, 
to develop ‘Islamic’ rules that would apply to the various fields that were not governed 
by scriptural commands.70 In addition, he argued that the principle of acting in the service 
of public benefit (al-maslaha al-‘ammah) was a clear from the hadith “no harm and no 
retribution” (la darara wa la dirar).71 Moreover, he asserted the use of reason in knowing 
what the public good/benefit or maslaha . In addition, whereas universal goals or 
commands are to be identified in the scriptural texts, and accordingly72 respected, Rida 
argues that no universal command is ultimate such that if at some point it time it 
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commands people to act in such a way that “reason reveals to be harmful, people were 
obliged to ignore the supreme utilitarian command requiring exceptions to be made in 
such circumstances.”  
Although, in Rida’s methodology, ijtihad was to be performed by a “religio-legal” 
73 specialist, who would be responsible for identifying the universal rulings and goals of 
the Shari’a, the method in which the SCC relies on his methodology as the primary 
framework in its application of Islamic jurisprudence demonstrates how Rida’s 
methodology allowed for more space for the secularly trained, rather than religio-legal, 
legalists to perform his conceptualization of ijtihad. Thus, Rida’s proposal for the 
reliance on concepts of maslaha and darura for legislation, and his call for abandoning 
almost most of the rules of the classical legal tradition or theory, allowed the new 
secularly trained jurists to frame their secular arguments as Islamic using Rida’s 
utilitarian modes of reasoning. In other words, it could be well-argued that Rida served as 
the link for modern legalists to pass legislation or issue rulings that were in essence 
secular but maintained an outlook of the traditional jurisprudence.  
In an answer to a question about the foundations, or literally roots (usul), of Islam 
that are of benefit (musliha) in all times and in any place, in the periodical al-Manar, Rida 
gives a detailed ten rules or roots, the seventh of which is 
“basing political and civil rulings on the concept of avoiding harm and promoting 
good or benefit, [basing] judicial rulings on ultimate justice and equality, and the 
obligation of the protection of religion, human being, reason, property and honor 
(accompanied by progeny and any assault on it).”74   
 
The terminology or rhetoric used by Rida in this quote is almost identical to that of the 
SCC rulings that we will investigate in later chapters. However, what is essential here is 
how Rida, a huge endorser of al-Shatibi’s maqasid as mentioned earlier, played the 
crucial role of reducing the classical discussions in such a utilitarian centered approach 
with almost no reference to the huge debates of the stakes of such an approach as 
opposed to how al-Shatibi and most classical scholars were weary of the use of a 
utilitarian theory in Islamic law. Although, the limitation on subjectivity and relativity 
that al-Shatibi includes in his theory, which is asserting that the masalih that the goals are 
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based on are absolute, includes in itself an element of subjectivity, and thus not a 
sufficient limitation, the claim here is that Rida is responsible for the reduced and 
simplistic form in which maslaha and maqasid are applied in the legal system in Egypt. 
Critique of Rashid Rida and the Theory of Maqasid 
Although Clark Lombardi argues that Rida expected his methodology to be used 
to draft codifiable rules which would be applied consistently in courts, Rida did not 
expect that it would be employed by judges “to develop rulings on a case-by-case basis,” 
75 Even though Rida had argued that constitutional safeguards should be put forth to 
prevent subjectivity and manipulation, Rida’s approach is still heavily criticized by many 
scholars. For example, Wael Hallaq has criticized Rida’s approach for being arbitrary 
where he chooses to accept causes such as welfare, interest and necessity from the 
revealed scriptures in order to reject nearly most classically accepted rulings without a 
proper theoretical justification.76  Moreover, in his article, “Maqasid and the Challenges 
of Modernity” discusses this issue of whether the maqasid can form a new foundation of 
legal reasoning, and after thorough analysis he argues for the incompatibility of the five 
universal/essential maqasid of al-Ghazali and discusses how each one of them does not 
fit in the modern context of the nation-state. Moreover, he argues that what most scholars 
who try to argue for the applicability of Islamic law in the modern state system do is 
basically revive a particular (classical) practice and modify this practice slightly to 
accommodate it to the “exigencies of the modern world.”77 Other scholars, however, have 
argued that endorsing utilitarian reasoning or theories of Islamic law. And using concepts 
such as public interest “can be an unconstrained, dangerously relativistic activity.”78 It is 
interesting to see how al-Shatibi’s theory has also been criticized from the contemporary 
advocates of the theory of maqasid in the religious circles but for completely different 
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reasons. The discussion of their criticism will follow the part that tackles what such 
figures, and their institutions, call for. 
ii. Abd el-Razzak al-Sanhuri 
Before proceeding with the discussion of how the maqasid theory was further developed 
in the 20th Century, it is essential to briefly investigate Sanhuri’s methodology and 
whether he used or contributed to the endorsement of the maqasid theory by legalists. 
Known for drafting the Egyptian Civil Code and for his calls in his early works for 
Islamic legislation and laws, Sanhuri was a highly influential and key figure in the 
Egyptian legal system.79  Even more so than being an influential figure, many scholars 
argue that Sanhuri’s ideas still continue to influence the thought of legalists who attempt 
to have any form of a modern Islamic legal system.80 
Like Rida, Sanhuri rejected the classical traditional fiqh and believed for the need 
to draft legislation that is consistent with the percepts of Islam.81 In addition, he also 
viewed that Islamic law promoted certain useful social goals. However, unlike Rida, 
Sanhuri rejected the idea that Muslims, in their era, were qualified to perform ijtihad like 
the classical jurists.82 In other words, Sanhuri sort of adhered to the “taqlid” argument.83 
However, he maintained that there were higher or universal principles that implicitly or 
explicitly existed in the traditional or classical jurisprudence.84 Thus, Sanhuri inducted 
from the writings of classical jurists a number of principles that are to be accepted by all 
Muslims and that legislation would necessarily be consistent. Although Sanhuri does not 
adopt or endorse the theory of maqasid or Rida’s reconceptualization of the theory, 
Sanhuri also depends on inductive reasoning which fortified this type of utilitarian 
thinking in modern Egyptian legal profession as a whole.  
It is very interesting to see that Sanhuri’s inductive reasoning is actually 
methodologically more sound and a lot closer to Shatibi’s inductive corroborative survey 
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than Rida’s methods of utilitarian reasoning, who used Shatibi as his main reference in 
his discussion of the maqasid and the need to adapt to new contexts. Sanhuri, as opposed 
to Rida, like Shatibi believed that the modern secularly trained judge does not have the 
tools to do ijtihad or engage with the scriptural sources directly, even when trying to 
induce the aims of the Shari’a, and thus he has to depend the classical jurists’ works. This 
is more in line with Shatibi’s limitations on the non-trained jurist or “pseudo”-mujtahid. 
In addition, the method that Sanhuri defines through it the general principles that should 
be respected by the legislator is based on an inductive survey of the classical jurists’ 
works, which is closer to what Shatibi calls for. Since both Sanhuri and Rida had a great 
influence on the legal field in Egypt, it is interesting to investigate if the SCC rulings 
show any signs of the adoption of Sanhuri’s method of inductive reasoning, which has 
more resemblance to the classical theory of maqasid. 
 
iii. Influential Religious Figures  
 The maqasid discourse was widely used in the 20th Century such that figures like 
Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood used the discourse of maqasid 
to interpret certain verses of the Qur’an and relate them to political and religious contexts 
that were happening during his lifetime.85 Also, Sayyed Qutb’s interpretation of the 
Qur’an and views of Islamic legislation is viewed by some authors to have been mainly 
based on the maqasid.86 Thus, most of the religious scholarship about maqasid is mainly 
about its importance as a tool for modern legislation that would be Islamic yet modern. 
However, this part will involve the discussion of how certain religious key figures have 
influenced the theory of maqasid in the 20th Century. After Rida, the most cited modern 
scholarly work on maqasid is by a Tunisian religious scholar called Muhammad al-Tahir 
Ibn ‘Ashur. 
Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn ‘Ashur 
Although it was Rida who re-introduced or highlighted the theory of maqasid as the 
‘Islamic’ utilitarian theory, Ibn ‘Ashur, who wrote extensively on the maqasid in the mid-
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twentieth century reconceptualized the theory and argued that it had to be modified in 
order to be suitable to the new contexts. Like Rida, Ibn ‘Ashur also critiqued the 
traditional/classical (usuli) rules and methodologies for being too concerned with the 
technicalities of the jurisprudential (fiqhi) process and for failing to serve the higher 
purposes and wisdom of the Shari’a.87  
The fact that Ibn ‘Ashur is widely cited in all contemporary writings calling for 
the adoption of the theory of maqasid is due to the fact that unlike Rida, Ibn ‘Ashur 
deeply engaged with al-Shatibi’s theory in al-Muwafaqat and tried to take the theory a 
step further. Consequently, Ibn ‘Ashur, reflecting the dominating modern influence on his 
ideas, argued that more ideals or concepts should be added to what al-Ghazali and al-
Shatibi included in their hierarchy of needs for example freedom, equality, moderation, 
the maintenance of order and securing the strength of the  nation or ‘ummah.’ In other 
words, it is Ibn ‘Ashur who introduced the idea of developing the theory of maqasid such 
that it would include new values to it that match the modern contexts, and this is why he 
is cited by most religious reformers.  
What Ibn ‘Ashur proposes though is not nothing of novelty and he is arguably not 
very different from Rida. For instance, Ibn ‘Ashur makes very similar arguments to Rida 
like the argument that all the scriptural texts are reasoned and that it is the role of human 
beings to use their reason to know what the ultimate goals or maqasid are from the 
texts.88 Thus, Ibn ‘Ashur engaged with the scriptural texts to induce the maqasid that 
match the new contexts. However, Ibn ‘Ashur, unlike Rida, does not call for the theory to 
be endorsed by the state or in other words a secular body, for legislation or other 
purposes. Ibn ‘Ashur’s assertion on the importance of the use of the maqasid theory is 
clear in his exegesis (tafsir) of the Qur’an, which takes the maqasid as the theoretical or 
foundational framework for interpretation and application of the text in the modern 
context.89 His use of maqasid as the framework for the employment of human reason to 
comprehend and apply the Qur’an in ways that are more compatible or in harmony with 
the modern context is one of the main reasons that Ibn ‘Ashur is considered by the 
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religious reformers to have succeeded at reviving the theory of maqasid.90 For instance, 
Tariq Ramadan, when discussing a new approach to the maqasid, says that Ibn ‘Ashur’s 
“new approach and categorization of the higher objectives . . . is very useful for us 
today.”91 Ibn ‘Ashur, however, does not attempt to advance any radical interpretations 
through his use of maqasid. For example, defends polygamy by claiming that the maqsid 
or purpose behind polygamy in Islam is that it is a means to increase the Muslim 
population and the expansion of the ummah.92 Finally, the reason Ibn ‘Ashur is discussed 
here, although he did not come up with a new theory or even develop the theory in a 
significant manner, where it could be argued that what he did was merely a reiteration of 
classical debates in a modern rhetoric, is because of the role he is perceived to have 
played in ‘modernizing’ maqasid and sort of taking it a step further to be endorsed in the 
mentalities of contemporary religious scholars, who as will be shown in the coming 
section, played a crucial role in introducing the theory of maqasid as a classically sound 
theory to (the Islamist) audiences which affected how the Islamists would perceive the 
use of the maqasid by the SCC judges. 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi could be considered as one of the huge supporters, if not the leader, of 
the use of the maqasid theory as a modern methodological framework for Islamic law. 
Qaradawi has authored and co-authored dozens of books that discuss the maqasid and the 
crucial role that they should play as the contemporary sound methodology modern 
Islamic jurisprudence.93 According to Qaradawi, he has focused his efforts in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century to disseminate knowledge about maqasid.94  
Accordingly, it is worth investigating how Qaradawi conceptualizes maqasid and 
its application. Qaradawi perceives the maqasid doctrine as the “new jurisprudence (fiqh) 
. . . that would enlighten the path of the Islamic awakening movement and ‘clarify’ its 
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ultimate objective,” and that it is the most crucial knowledge that a jurist must acquire.95 
In addition, he heavily criticizes scholars who refuse to endorse the doctrine and insist on 
the literal meanings if scriptural commands. However, to prove the authenticity of the 
maqasid and its soundness as a channel to a new jurisprudence, Qaradawi gives a list of 
both classical scholars (other than al-Shatibi) such as ibn Taymiyah, Ibn al-Qayim and 
modern scholars such as Rashid Rida, Mahmoud Shalut, Mohamed al-Ghazali, Sayyed 
Sabek and Mohamed Abu Zahra, who all depended on utilitarian reasoning or the 
maqasid in their understanding of the scriptural sources.96  
 Qaradawi then discusses the categorizations of Ghazali and how to induce the 
rulings form the texts. Then, he asks whether modern jurists have to strictly follow the 
classical methodology and Ghazali’s categories, and answers by asserting that jurists 
should not be bound with the five categories of Ghazali and demonstrates how Rashid 
Rida has identifies different categories of maqasid.97 Also, dedicating a whole chapter in 
one of his books on Rida’s opinions on maqasid, Qaradawi chooses an excerpt in which 
Rida discusses the importance of departing the classical methodologies and to be more 
realistic (not perfectionist) in accepting the fact that judges and legalists do not have to 
meet all the classical criteria exactly the same way that many of the caliphs did not meet 
the criteria of the ‘good’ caliph, where  “parliament members who would be elected in a 
democratic government should be aware of the juristic opinions and the maqasid.”98  
 Qaradawi then classifies how people perceive or apply the maqasid in three 
categories. The first category includes what he labels as the “neo-Zahiris” or the 
literalists who basically refuse to accept the maqasid and any kind of utilitarian reasoning 
as their methodological framework.99 Qaradawi criticizes this group very heavily for how 
they insist on sticking to the literal meanings of texts and for being against any form of 
reform or other creative methods of preaching (da‘wa).100 Moreover, he mentions 
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classical scholars like Ibn-Hazm who shared the same “rigid” mindset.101 The second 
category includes those who “abuse” the maqasid doctrine, like secularists, who use the 
maqasid to hinder the application of the Shari’a.102 When describing this group, 
Qaradawi is mainly concerned about their use of maqasid to encourage Muslims not to do 
their obligatory worships (‘ibadat) like fasting Ramadan or praying the five prayers if the 
ultimate or higher objective of such worships are attained without doing the specific act 
of worshipping.103 The third category, which Qaradawi tackles the most extensively, is 
what he calls the “Moderate” school.104 Apparent from its title, this is the school of 
thought that he encourage readers to subscribe to. This school is highlighted by its ability 
to link specific texts to the general or higher objectives, and by not stressing on the mere 
application of the letter of the law or scriptural texts.105 Furthermore, he argues against 
the division or categorization of fiqh in separate categories such as the jurisprudence of 
worship, jihad, and other categories and calls for linking texts of the Shari’a and its 
rulings to each other.106 Lastly, he stresses on the ability of the jurist to: differentiate 
between fixed objectives and certain temporary objectives that would make the higher 
objective more attainable; identify the necessities (daruriyyat) from the needs (hajiyyat) 
from the refinements (tahsiniyyat); and to always search for the higher objective before 
deciding on what the ruling would be.107 
Qaradawi’s Background and Influence  
A member of the Islamist opposition to the Nasserist regime and the following regimes, 
Qaradawi gained immense popularity in the Muslim world from his appearance on al-
Jazeera channel’s program al-Shari‘a wa al-Hayah starting in the 1990’s.108 Thus, 
Qaradawi has been able to reach audiences worldwide also through his presidency of the 
Islamic Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) and the European Council on Fatwa and 
Research (ECFR) that were all aiming at helping Muslims integrate themselves in their 
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respective societies in a modern context.109 Qaradawi thus, through his direct connection 
to mass audiences, was able to not only introduce the juristic reasoning based on maqasid 
(al-fikr al-maqasidi), but even more so to frame it as an authentic classical methodology 
that was the solution to modernizing Islamic jurisprudence the ‘right’ way. Thus, even if 
Qaradawi had no influence on the Egyptian judiciary or legal system in general, it could 
be argued that he played a major role in introducing the maqasid doctrine to the public, 
Islamists included, as an inherently classical and coherent methodology of applying 
Islamic law. Accordingly, it could be argued that Qaradawi familiarized the audiences, 
specifically Islamists in Egypt, with the whole maqasid rhetoric, that the SCC would start 
employing in the 1990’s. 
 In addition, al-Qaradawi is one of the founders of al-Furqan Islamic Heritage 
Foundation, in which a research center in the name of “Al-Maqasid Research Center in 
the Philosophy of Islamic Law” (markaz dirasat maqasid al-shari‘a al-Islamiyya) was 
established in 2005 for the purpose of producing literature (lectures, workshops and 
books) on the application of the maqasid, and to take the maqasid from the realm of 
theories to the realm of application.110111 It is very interesting though that one of the 
biggest series of lectures were prepared with the collaboration of the Law Faculty of 
Alexandria University, where many of the research papers presented were done by 
legalists or graduate law students.112 This demonstrates the way in which Islamist 
reformers have realized the importance of proliferating ‘their’ conceptualization of the 
maqasid doctrine and how it should be applied. It is worth mentioning, however, that in a 
lecture by Mohammed Selim el-Awwa, who is also one of the founders of the Maqasid 
Research Center, he discusses the importance of adopting the mindset or theory of 
maqasid in the judiciary and he mentions the SCC’s use of maqasid. However, he makes 
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a very shallow statement of praising the SCC judges for their use of maqasid without any 
analysis of their methodology.113 
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III.              THE EGYPTIAN SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (SCC) 
 
This chapter will discuss (supreme) constitutional courts in general, and the different 
arguments or theories about their roles in the legal system. Next, the discussion will focus 
on the case of the SCC in Egypt and its political and historical background. Accordingly, 
the chapter will tackle how the court came to existence and possible reasons behind its 
creation. Then, the discussion will move to how the court took upon its shoulders a role 
that is different from the one that was prescribed for it. This period, the 1990’s often 
called the ‘Golden Age’ of the Egyptian SCC is the main focus of the chapter, and thesis. 
Lastly, the chapter will discuss how the Mubarak regime curbed the defiant political 
activity of the court. 
The reason the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court is the focus of this paper is 
mainly because it has earned a reputation of “being the most powerful court in the Arab 
world and at times stood on a global level for the audacity of its rulings.”114 In addition, 
with the exception of Clark Lombardi, almost no other scholar focuses on the 
methodology of the SCC with respect to Islamic law. Even more so, there is a gap in the 
literature that analyzes and contextualizes the court’s use of the maqasid in specific.  
There is a lot of the literature that addresses the SCC and how the court applies 
personal status law to trace its development.115 In addition, the SCC’s rulings have been 
greatly analyzed, especially reading the unlimited powers of the judges to take on the 
tasks of classical jurists with no clear methodology to follow.116 The literature on the 
SCC can be divided in two categories: 1) Literature that traces the development of the 
court in an authoritarian regime and analyzes the political role that the court played since 
its establishment and 2) Literature that analyzes the SCC’s theory of Islamic law and its 
application. However, the literature that specifically focuses on the SCC’s methodology 
and application of Islamic law is much less that which examines the court’s political role.  
The scholarly views on the SCC’s methodology and application of Islamic law are 
mainly about the inconsistent and often incoherent juristic logic of the court with regards 
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to its methodology in applying Islamic law117. Some scholars argue that the court departs 
from the classical theory and does not even “fit neatly in the modern tradition of neo-
ijtihad”118 which was developed by Rashid Rida in the early 20th Century. The scholarly 
analyses on the SCC’s use of maqasid mainly traces the development of the concept since 
Rashid Rida started advocating for its use and how the court has adopted the concept 
such that it became one of the most important parts of the SCC’s method.  Later in this 
chapter the reviewing and discussing in details the SCC and its conception and use of 
Islamic law. 
 
A. Supreme Constitutional Courts: Theory and Practice 
Theoretically, constitutional courts are irrelevant of the political setting in a state.119 In 
other words, if there is “no constitution, or if the document is suspended, or if the entire 
political system appears to be operating outside of constitutional channels,” this should not 
be of relevance to a constitutional court since they are adjudicative bodies.120 However, 
due the important role that constitutional courts occupy in addressing fundamental 
questions, “constitutional courts and their justices take on an aura that extends beyond the 
strictly adjudicative: they often serve as ultimate symbols of the state. . . [as] the last resort 
for those searching for the locus of sovereignty.”  Practically though, constitutional courts 
do get involved in political contests. The twentieth century marked the worldwide creation 
of constitutional courts, where strong and independent constitutional courts were often a 
sign of a functional rule of law system.121 Accordingly, the way in which people perceive 
verdicts of the SCC is unlike any other court in the Egyptian legal system, where they are 
perceived as quintessentially reflective of the judiciary’s ideological inclinations. 
However, that does not imply that the SCC is perceived to be less political than any other 
court, but rather that it perceived to reflect the judiciary’s mindset or political choices.  
 Some scholars argue that the role of constitutional courts is vague or hard to define 
due to their ‘prescribed’ involvement in politics.122 In other words, constitutional review, 
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which is one of the main functions of constitutional courts, “constitutes a political control 
of political powers by the means of law.”123 Thus, politics and law become meshed through 
the constitutional courts role. Constitutional courts are often described as “reactive 
institutions” because of the fact that they are only allowed to influence political decisions 
if cases are brought before them.124 Furthermore, another crucial aspect to how influential 
a court can be in politics is the selection procedure of justices.125 The issue of the selection 
of judges played a key role in how the Mubarak regime manages to curb or restrain the 
liberal political agenda of the SCC, where President Mubarak used his right to appoint 
judges to fill the court with judges that were affiliated with his regime.126 Accordingly, the 
‘new’ justices manages to constrain the activities of the rather liberal justices. 
 Furthermore, the argumentation that a court depends on to support its decisions is 
a critical aspect as well, where the approach that a court chooses to present its 
argumentation is one of the strategies to gain the acceptance of the society as a whole. 
Consequently, “judges have to act strategically, finding the right balance of “judicial self-
restrain” in different situations” in order to win political actors’ confidence as well as that 
of the society as a whole.127 In other words, by producing decisions or methods of reasoning 
that are “accepted” by the public, the court can establish trust and confidence in the 
institution, where the public’s perception of the court, and its justices , as a neutral and 
competent entity greatly affects how the public’s expectations of the court.128 Finally, the 
need, and utilization, of a specific “idealized” way of presenting its decisions highly 
influences the process of producing decisions.129 This demonstrates how the SCC’s 
adoption and use of the theory of the maqasid is not just a haphazard but rather a closely 
calculated choice of argumentation. In other words, the court’s choice of the discourse or 
rhetoric of the maqasid as the form of utilitarian reasoning through which they pass their 
political choices under the umbrella of Islamic law is no arbitrary one. As discussed in the 
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previous chapter, the maqasid rhetoric and discourse was heavily used by religious 
reformers in the last quarter of a century of the 20th century, where many scholars were 
presenting it as the contemporary sound, coherent and authentic methodological 
framework that should be adopted by jurists to interpret the Islamic scriptural sources in 
order to meet the new realities of the modern context. Accordingly, it could be argued that 
the fact that the SCC chose the maqasid in its argumentation was one of the methods of 
choosing an “idealized” or accepted method that the public was being familiarized with by 
the religious reformers. Moreover, this specific choice of accepted argumentation that the 
public has confidence in would then allow the court to pass its political choices in a socially 
‘accredited’ rhetoric.  
Historical and Political Context 
When examining the roles of constitutional courts, many scholars trace the reasons behind 
the establishment of constitutional courts. Accordingly, scholars have examined the 
political context at the time of the establishment of the SCC under President Anwar el-
Sadat in 1979 and the purpose it was supposed to serve at that time.130 The Supreme 
Constitutional Court in Egypt replaced the Supreme Court, which had been established 
under the Nasserist regime in 1969.131 The SCC was established by the passing of Law 48 
of 1979.132 The ‘new’ SCC was entrusted to perform three main functions: First, it is 
expected to serve as the final authority in any case of dispute between two Egyptian courts; 
Second, “it has the power to issue authoritative interpretations of legislative texts if 
different judicial institutions . . . have disagreed about their proper interpretation and ‘they 
have an importance that necessitates their uniform interpretation;’”133and finally, the SCC 
has the right to perform constitutional review, especially when lower courts identify a 
challenging or demanding constitutional question.134  
 Law 48 provides details about the high qualifications of SCC justices such that the 
court would maintain its prestige. Moreover, Law 48 also provides protections and 
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guarantees of independence for the SCC justices.135 However, Law 48 gives the executive 
almost complete control over the appointments of justices.136 For, example, the Chief 
Justice is chosen based on the complete discretion of the President, given that he meets the 
criteria of the position.137 In addition, also in appointing associate justices, the President 
has the final choice from two justices nominated by the Chief Justice and the other by the 
general assembly of the court.138 Furthermore, Law 48 does not specify the number of 
justices, which is s very crucial point and has been used by the regime as a method of 
taming the court. In other words, if the President and Chief Justice are unsatisfied by the 
justices for any reason, the Chief Justice can nominate as many justices as he wishes and 
the President would appoint them.139  
 The reasons behind the establishment of the court are debated. However, Tamir 
Moustafa makes a compelling argument that President Sadat established the SCC as a mean 
of attracting foreign investment.140In other words, to build more trust in the new regime , 
given the history of Nasser’s nationalization of the vast majority of the private sector, Sadat 
was attempting to legitimate his new regime and give Egypt the outlook of the state of 
institutions” and   rule of law. Thus, by creating the SCC, which would theoretically have 
some form of control over the executive, Sadat made sure by his appointment of justices 
that such an institution was under his control.141 Sadat was mainly concerned with creating 
guarantees of property rights and the task that this court can perform to take serious steps 
in the economic liberalization of Egypt. However, Sadat was aware of the potential political 
role that the court could take by also attempting to advance political liberalization as 
well.142 Thus, Sadat tried to ensure the cautious choice of justices, and accordingly, when 
he died in 1981 the court was not of any concern to the Mubarak regime until the late 
1980’s. Throughout the 1980’s the court was mainly concerned with showing its 
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independence and powers however mainly through its attention to challenges to economic 
legislation.143 
B. The SCC’s Golden Age: mid-1980s till the late 1990s  
Many scholars have analyzed the “puzzling phenomenon”144 of a liberal court that 
functioned in an authoritarian setting, where it is argued that studying such courts “makes 
us understand why such courts are needed and also helps to demonstrate the fragility of 
such institutions.”145 By the mid-1980s, the court started challenging the regime and 
showing off its powers. In 1985, demonstrating its abilities in challenging the executive, 
the court struck down the family reforms that Sadat had passed in 1979 under the 
“interminable” state of emergency.146 The court was making a clear statement to the 
Mubarak regime that it was willing to take a stance against the executive if it used the 
emergency cards. By the late 1980s, the old justices who were appointed by Sadat, and 
were an invaluable support to the regime, started retiring and being exchanged by new 
justices.147 The process of appointment of the new justices, who came to challenge 
Mubarak’s regime, is not known, and scholars have wondered about how Mubarak was 
unable to do what Sadat had done.148 The new justices thus came to embrace a new and 
more expansive approach to the liberal ideals that they wanted the court to promote, where 
the protection of civil and political rights became a focus of the court as well.149 As a result, 
in the late 1980s, the court struck down election laws which resulted in the dissolution of 
parliament and forced new parliamentary elections. In the 1990s, however, the court 
expanded its vision even more to protect individual rights. 
 Some scholars have noted their admiration to the strategies in which the court was 
able to challenge the Mubarak regime.150 In other words, the court managed to ‘exploit’ 
the need of the regime to its economic liberalization support to challenge the regime in 
other aspects such as political and civil rights. Accordingly, when the regime was in dire 
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need of the role that the court was meant to perform, the court used its autonomy to deliver 
judgements that would leash the authoritarian powers of the regime over political and civil 
right and then later individual rights.151 Accordingly, successive SCC rulings tacked 
different issues like “electoral candidacy, pert registration, freedom of expression, and 
human rights advocacy.”152  The role that the SCC was playing thus brought it worldwide 
attention and a reputation for its audacity of challenging an authoritarian regime. 
Accordingly, activists were attempting to push the court further in order to pressure the 
regime to allow for more individual rights.  
Unable to utilize provisions in the constitution that would advance individual/citizen rights 
outside the realms of politics and property, due to the vagueness of provisions and 
contradictions, the SCC introduced its rather new jurisprudence by arguing that they had 
to respect international human rights standards.153 The court based its interpretation of the 
‘rule of law’ provisions of the constitutions, where they interpreted it as a requirement for 
the executive to apply the international standards.154 SCC judges in the 1990s even 
promoted the use of international human rights and sponsored conferences and lectures to 
encourage other legalists to endorse such doctrines as sources of law and, also encouraged 
legalists to use the new comparative law methods that were used in other constitutional 
courts around the world.155 This demonstrates the rather creative methodologies or 
reasoning that the court deploys when it has (wants) to advance a certain agenda and the 
text/constitution does not tackle or serve that agenda.  
C. The SCC, Islamists & Article 2  
Surprisingly, as the confrontation with the executive increased and the pressures 
increased on the court, the court embarked on resorting to the Islamist opposition by 
using Islamic legal arguments.156 In order to address the politics of the court with the 
Islamists, the discussion needs to trace the adoption of Article 2 of the 1971 constitution, 
its development and consequences. When adopted in 1971, Article 2 stated that, “Islam is 
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the religion of the state, Arabic is the official language, the principles of the Islamic 
Shari’a shall be a chief source of legislation (mabadi’ al-Shari’a al-Islamiyya masadr 
ra’isi li-‘l tashri’).”157 Thus, Islamists and the ‘ulama (religious scholars) perceived it as 
the window for legislative reforms of existing secular laws. The ‘ulama, in the 1970s 
under Sadat, became more assertive in taking a role in legislation. Accordingly, they 
formed a committee and developed a draft code that was based on fiqh and in 1976, 
wishing to revise the existing codes such that they would be based on Islamic law.158 
However, obviously, such reforms did not take place, but this demonstrates how high the 
aspirations of applying Shari’a were at that time by all the interested parties. 
 Not in harmony with the ‘ulama, where there had been tensions in 1972, the 
Islamists, consisting mainly of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more militant jama‘at, 
were also pressuring the regime to make more concessions and reforms to apply the 
Shari’a.159 The pressures on the regime and the judiciary by Islamists were very intense 
to the extent that in 1976, the SCC issued an opinion stating that Article 2 “might require 
all Egyptian law to be consistent with the essential principles of the Shari’a.”160 
Regardless of the fact that there is nothing new in this statement, Clark Lombardi argues 
that such a decision, at that time, when the court was still very weak and generally did not 
challenge the Sadat regime, signaled that “there were Islamists in the upper reaches of the 
judiciary. . . [and] that the government was permitting them to speak out.”161 
 In 1980, after immense pressures from both the Islamists and the ‘ulama, Article 2 
gets amended, when one-third of the members of the parliament propose in 1979, under 
the influence of the regime, to amend the article such that it would include the Shari’a as 
the “chief source of legislation.”162 What that precisely implied in term of applicability 
was extremely vague, especially that the court at that time a fairly weak institution and 
was primarily seeking to merely establish its independence and gain the prestige and 
respect that the judiciary always fought for.163 Thus, although the SCC was responsible 
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for giving an authoritative interpretation of Article 2, in the beginning of the 1980s, it 
was tried to avoid having to side with either the regime on one hand or the Islamists on 
the other.164 
 Starting the 1990s however, the court’s attitude towards Islamists changed, where 
they became key players in how the court performed its politics. Building on its role of 
curbing the executive and promoting the rights of speech and association, the court also 
started employing Islamic law as a key element in its jurisprudence. How the court was 
applying Article two and its understanding of what constitutes the principles of the 
Shari’a is a very interesting discussion, where only by 1993 the court began to issue 
opinions that engaged deeply with Article 2. Contextualizing the court’s decision or 
choice to use Islamic law as a cornerstone of its argumentation in the 1990s, Clark 
Lombardi argues that Egypt was witnessing unprecedented political upheaval and that the 
confrontation between the secularist executive and militant Islmaist jama‘at was had 
soared where the jama’at had resorted to violence.165 For example, the jama’at had started 
targeting the secularist opposition as well as tourism, which were an integral part of the 
economy. Tourism, more importantly here, was one of the main sources of income for the 
Egyptian economy. Egypt was (is) considered to be a rentier or semi-rentier state due to 
the fact that a substantial portion of the economic revenues were based on the ‘rent’ of 
multiple resources.166 Thus, rent from tourism alongside that from the Suez Canal, and 
USAID formed the main bulk of the sources or revenues for the Egyptian Economy that 
did not require much economic efforts.167 In other words, this rent was of strategic value 
given that the state deployed “a minimal of its national labor to extract such 
resources.”168 Thus, when the militant Islamist groups were targeting tourists, it was a 
major threat to the regime and the new outlook it had been trying to create for years of 
being liberal, and thus safe for foreigner. As a result of such militant attacks on the 
sources of income of the state, Lama Abu Odeh argues that “Egypt moved from an 
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ideology of national socialism to the non-ideology of “security plus rentierism”. . .” Thus, 
the state focused its efforts to crack down on the miltant jama’at.  
 The SCC, thus, in 1993, with the Islamist violence and turbulent political context, 
felt the need to clarify its stance with regards to its understanding and application of the 
Shari’a being “the chief source of legislation”. Having discussed how the court had sided 
with the activists against the executive, and given the militancy of the Islamists, some 
scholars argue that the court chose to also contain the Islamists by demonstrating that it 
was serious about the interpretation and application of Article 2.169 As a result, “the SCC 
may have felt pressure to open a dialogue....and to offer the courts as a forum in which 
Islamists could get a real hearing for their concerns. For it do this, the SCC had to 
demonstrate that it was committed to developing a theory of Article 2 that reflected a 
serious respect for (and facility with) the Islamic legal tradition.”170  
 Thus, the SCC seems to have carefully designed its rhetoric and theory of Islamic 
law such that it would appeal to the Islamists, especially militant opposition, meanwhile 
it made sure to maintain some of form of vagueness in its rhetoric with respect to its 
interpretation of Article 2. The maqasid then, was one of this carefully chosen theories, 
where the court used the rhetoric of the maslaha and maqasid, discussed by Rashid Rida, 
as its methodological framework for identifying what would be considered ‘Islamic’. 
However, its choice of framing Rida’s methodology as a classical one, where there is no 
reference to Rida in any of the cases demonstrates how the court was careful in its choice 
of  a rhetoric that would be seem to be authentic and classically derived. In the next 
chapter, the discussion will move to the analysis of SCC cases and how the court 
deployed the theory of maqasid. However, it is worth mentioning how Mubarak then in 
the new millennium managed to tame the court. 
D. Mubarak packing the SCC with Affiliated Judges  
Scholars often trace how Mubarak packed the court with judges affiliated with regime in 
2001 in order to restrict its increasing activism.171 As Lama Abu Odeh puts it, “The 
SCC’s 1990s jurisprudence surpassed the limit of liberalization the regime was willing to 
tolerate, leading eventually to the replacement of the Chief justice of the court with a 
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regime insider.”172 The Mubarak regime, in the late 1990’s, was able to attack the court 
first by quashing the supportive activists and civil society.173 Then, destiny played its role 
when the SCC’s Chief Justice passed away in 2001. Mubarak thus seized the opportunity 
to appoint a new Chief Justice who would be “an unapologetic political ally of the 
executive and an outspoken critic of the court’s earlier attempts to interfere with 
repressive executive action.”174 Accordingly, the court was finally curbed, and since then, 
scholars have analyzed the court’s jurisprudence and role in facilitating the transition to 
neo-liberalism in both politics and economics as the Mubarak regime had hoped.175  
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IV.            THE SCC’s CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MAQASID: CASE STUDIES 
 
This chapter will examine two prominent SCC cases, and will focus on the court’s 
application of the maqasid theory as its theoretical framework, or rather as an integral 
aspect of its interpretation of Article 2. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first 
section will briefly discuss the two cases and their backgrounds. The second section will 
then be the analysis of the cases and the court’s jurisprudence, or logic, in both cases. 
Moreover, the analysis will focus on common themes or patterns that are present in the 
court’s jurisprudence versus how such themes were perceived by the classical theorists of 
maqasid, specifically Ghazali and Shatibi, to trace how the court used such classical 
notion(s) as a tool in its politics to mediate between conflicting political forces. 
 Although the rhetoric of maqasid is present in almost all cases in which Article 2 
is discussed until the present time, the chapter will focus on cases that were brought forth 
to the court in the court’s “Golden Age”. This is apparently due to: the significance of 
that time period in the history of the court’s jurisprudence, to the importance of 
examining the context of why and how the court first embarked on deploying the 
maqasid as its framework to interpret Islamic law. For the translation of cases, I have 
mainly depended on Clark Lombardi and Nathan Brown’s translation of cases due to the 
scarcity of proper legal translations of cases. In every case, the discussion will start with a 
brief account of what the case was about and then an analysis of the use of maqasid. 
 
A.    Case No. 7 of Judicial Year 8, May 1993 
Having the political background in mind, this case is the first case176 in which the SCC 
gave a detailed decision of its interpretation of Article 2 and thus, starting using the 
maqasid doctrine in its conception of Shari’a. 
Background 
Case no. 7 was brought to the SCC after a case of divorce in which Articles 18 and 20 of 
Personal Status Law 25 as amended by Law 100 of 1985, were challenged as being 
unconstitutional and inconsistent with Article 2 of the constitution.177 Article 18 of 
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Personal Status Law 25 “granted special custody rights to women who had been divorced 
their husbands without cause (in other words, when the woman was not at fault).”178 
Meanwhile, Article 20, “permitted a judge to order a man to pay his divorced wife a sum 
of money analogous to an alimony payment. . . (mut’a).”179 Having applied these two 
articles, the judge then gave the mother permanent custody of the children and also 
ordered that a mut’a would be paid to her by the husband. Unsatisfied with the court’s 
decision, the husband challenged that the two applied articles on the Personal Status Law 
25 were inconsistent with Article 2 and thus the case was referred to the SCC.180 
 In this case, more specifically, the father argued that from 1929 until 1979, the 
Hanafi doctrine was the basis of personal status law, and accordingly, when Article 2 was 
drafted, the principles of the Shari’a are expected to also follow the Hanafi doctrine. 
Because the challenged law had adopted the Maliki doctrine for custody laws, and 
unwilling to be limited to the Hanafi doctrine, the court rejected the father’s claim that 
Article 2 had to follow solely the Hanafi doctrine.181 Moreover, the court even asserted 
that modern Muslims are not bound anymore to apply only a specific classical doctrine, 
and also ruled that both Articles 18 and 20 of Personal Status Law 25 were constitutional. 
182  
 
B. Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, May 1996 
Although there are other cases in which the maqasid rhetoric was used between the 
previous case and this one183, I chose this specific case for its prominence and in order to 
examine if there were changes in the court’s (political) inclinations or choices between 
the executive and the Islamists that could be implied from the court’s decision. 
Background 
This case was referred to the SCC by the Administrative court of Alexandria when a 
guardian of two girls challenged a series of administrative decisions by the Minister of 
Education regulating the wearing the of the face veil (niqab), where it was prohibited for 
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girls wearing the niqab to enter schools.184 This case was very popular as the 
administrative rulings by the Minister of education were very controversial due to the 
widespread Islamism. The Mubarak regime, however, was defying the Islamists and the 
spread of the ideals that they called for, especially the more conservative niqab than just 
the head cover (hijab). Thus, the Ministerial decision specified a uniform for school girls 
which prohibited both the hijab and niqab, but then amended to accept the hijab if the girl 
would bring an authorization from her guardian allowing her to wear it.185 However, the 
niqab continued to be outlawed by the new decision, as it was seen as an ideal of the 
more extreme or militant Islamists.  
 The father of the two girls then argued that expelling his daughters from school 
because of the new decision was a violation of Articles 2 and 41 of the Constitution.186 
Article 41 “guarantees the preservation of personal freedom [and bars] violation of it.”187 
Surprisingly, the Administrative Court of Alexandria ruled in favor of the father against 
the Minister until the SCC ruled in the constitutionality of the new Ministerial 
decisions.188 The SCC ruled in favor of the Ministerial decision. However, its 
argumentation in this case is thorough and detailed regarding its methodology of the use 
of reason and promoting maslaha, the maqasid, and the limits on the powers of ijtihad.  
 
C. Analysis, Interpretations and Criticisms  
Some scholars, specifically Brown and Lombardi, have analyzed the court’s methodology 
and have demonstrated how it is a mix of Rida and Sanhuri’s methodologies.189 Thus, the 
focus here alternatively will be on the court’s conception of maqasid, ijtihad, the 
mujtahid, maslaha, and the certainty of texts versus how Ghazali and Shatibi perceived 
such concepts.  Accordingly, such comparisons would enable us to trace (in)consistent 
and (in)coherent patterns in the court’s methodology and use of classical notions. The 
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reason the discussion will start with concepts like ijtihad, the certainty of texts and 
maslaha before the maqasid is due to the fact that such concepts were integral to how the 
maqasid was to be used. In other words, if such concepts are all misapplied, then the 
methodology of the maqasid becomes hollow of its constituents and limitations. 
Although Rida relied on Shatibi’s work heavily in his writings and in his attempts 
to put forth a theory/methodology for modern Islamic legislation to the extent that he 
republished Shatibi’s book al-‘Itisam as mentioned earlier, it is very interesting to see 
how Rida almost contradicted most of what Shatibi had theorized. In other words, Rida, 
and accordingly the SCC, took only a very superficial part, and arguably negligible 
portion, of Shatibi’s theory and disregarded all of his criticism of the misapplication of 
the law. Accordingly, while Shatibi addressed issues like who has the criteria to do 
ijtihad and interpret the scriptural texts, the incoherence of jurists when they mix 
different doctrines (madhahib) and use legal stratagems (hiyal) to avoid the application of 
the law, and how the concept of maslaha should be understood, Rida disregarded the 
whole of Shatibi’s work and only endorsed the fact Shatibi called for the use of reason 
and the maqasid to come up with new rulings that would meet the new contexts. 
However, in doing so, Rida and then the SCC were not only unfaithful and deviated from 
Shatibi’s classical methodology or framework, but actually abused his theory, which 
addressed the incompatibility of the law, to achieve their own agendas. Accordingly, in 
the following discussion will explain how Rida and the SCC applied Shatibi’s theory 
different from how he theorized.  
1. Ijtihad and the Mujtahid 
In both cases examined here, the court, in its interpretation of Article 2, has generally  
adopted Rida’s general theory and conceptualization of ijtihad to refer to the use reason 
to interpret the scriptural texts that are not absolutely certain and of ambiguous 
authenticity in order to come up with rulings that are generally considered 
presumptive.190 Moreover, the court also adopted Rida’s use of the concept pf maslaha 
and his restrictive understanding of what the legislator has to respect: only legal rulings 
that are absolutely certain in their authenticity and meaning.  
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Shatibi asserted that in order for a jurist to re-engage with the scriptural text, the 
Qur’an specifically, the jurist has to meet three criteria: first is adequate knowledge of 
Arabic; second, is knowing the circumstances of revelation; and third, is a holistic 
reading of the text, where he argues that the Qur’an should be treated as an integral 
whole.191 Moreover, he adds that a “full-fledged’ mujtahid must have acquired a thorough 
knowledge of “consensus and disagreement, abrogating and abrogated verses, the 
Prophetic Sunna, and the methods of legal reasoning and causation,” in order to do 
ijtihad.192 However, he adds that a jurist/mujtahid facing a new issue can adopt legal 
premises already established and proven by earlier mujtahids, whom he calls a “partial” 
mujtahid.193 Thus, Shatibi is clear that when a jurist is faced with a new issue that 
requires the derivation of a rule from the Qur’an, then knowledge of Arabic is 
indispensable, whereas any other field of knowledge may be compensated for through the 
reliance on the works of other jurists.194 It is then intriguing to see the deviation of the 
SCC and the use of the theories and ideas of Shatibi, when they completely contradict 
what he calls for. The significance of discussing Shatibi’s conceptualization of the 
mujtahid and the criteria he puts forth for the mujtahid to come up with new rulings that 
meet the new contexts is because Shatibi then it is this mujtahid who is expected to also 
acquire knowledge of the maqasid and its process of inductive corroboration of different 
sources to identify a goal of the Shari’a, which according to Shatibi should be a universal 
goal. 
 Shatibi then criticizes what he calls a “pseudo”-mujtahid, who does not have the 
necessary knowledge to do conduct ijtihad and who diverges from the “authoritative 
doctrines of predecessors” and asserts that genuine mujtahids do not generally diverge 
from precedent.195 Accordingly, according to Shatibi, a pseudo-mujtahid will eventually 
always produce a body of knowledge that is self-contradictory due to his use of reason to 
serve personal interests.196 Thus, it is very clear that with the exception of the use of the 
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word ‘maqasid’ in the SCC’s reasoning, the do not meet Shatibi’s criteria for ijtihad and 
mujtahids.  
 
2. Certainty of Texts and the Mixing of Doctrines 
Moreover, on the certainty of texts, Shatibi asserts, unlike the SCC and Rida, that 
ambiguous language in the Qur’an is few, and that it only pertains to particular rulings 
and not universal principles. This, could be the biggest contradictory between the SCC’s 
theoretical premises and Shatibi’s since the certainty/ambiguity of scriptural texts 
(accepting texts that are certain with respect to both authenticity and meaning) is one of 
the main pillars on which the court frees itself from the whole classical jurisprudence. 
Thus, whereas the court affirms in the Mut’a case that, 
A legislative text is not permitted to contradict Islamic legal rulings that are 
absolutely certain in their authenticity and meaning (al-ahkam al-shar‘iyya al-
qat‘iyya fi thubutiha wa dalalatiha). It is these rulings alone in which ijtihad is 
not permitted.  . . . . [It may only contravene] the rulings that are probable whether 
with respect to their authenticity or meaning or both (al-ahkam al-ahkam al-
zanniyya fi thubutiha aw dalalatiha aw fihmiha). The sphere of ijtihad is limited 
to them [the probable ruings of the Shari’a] . . . And they [ the rulings that are 
merely probable] change with the change of times and place in order to guarantee 
their malleability and vigor in order to face new circumstances and in order to 
organize the affairs of the people, with respect to their welfare from the 
consideration of law . . . And when there is not [Qur’anic] text that is certain in its 
meaning and authenticity that determines an age for custody (hadana), it is not 
permissible for the holder of power (wali al-amr) to overstep them. He (the wali 
al-amr) must derive a rule that protects the broad interests of the parties involved 
as demanded by the goals of the Shari’a. . . . The wali al-amr must weigh what he 
sees best and most beneficial for the little boy. . .197 
 
Shatibi would not disagree that the jurist should have the benefit of the child in mind 
when issuing a ruling; however, in that case, of an untrained jurist, Shatibi asserts that the 
jurist should perform taqlid and thus be a jurist-imitator (muqallid).198 However, the 
court’s limitation on what is considered certain is a deviation from what Shatibi calls for, 
where he asserts that it is only pseudo-mujtahids claim that ambiguous verses are many in 
order to serve their personal interests.199 Moreover, the court adds, 
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And whereas: It is clear from examining the doctrines of the jurists regarding the 
meaning of the Qur’anic texts (dalalat al-nusus al-Qur’aniyya) which have come 
to us in the matter of mut’a that they differ on their scope of their application and 
on whether giving it [mut’a] is, on the one hand, obligatory, or on the other hand 
meritorious [but not requires] And this only means that since these texts are 
probable in meaning, they are unclear about the desire of God, may He be exalted 
. . . [thus when] There is nothing in the Qur’anic texts informing us that God, may 
he be exalted, decreed it [a particular type or amount of mut’a] or set limits on it, 
inasmuch as they signify permission to organize it [the mut’a] so that he [the wali 
al-amr] realizes for the people, their benefits [that are] stipulated by the Shari’a 
(masalihum al-mu‘tabira shar’an). . . [B]eing compassionate to [the divorced 
wife] is part of the generosity (muru’a) which is demanded by the Islamic 
Shari’a. . . 200 
 
Thus, the court did resort to the classical jurisprudence regarding the issue at hand, and 
did a survey that matches Sanhuri’s methodology, where they induced from the survey 
that generosity (muru’a) is demanded by Shari’a. However, unlike what Shatibi calls for, 
the court did not choose/imitate any of the opinions from the classical jurisprudence. The 
court’s endorsement Rida’s  total rejection of the totality of classical jurisprudence, 
except on matters that the companions of the Prophet had consensus, is reflected in the 
court’s ruling in the Veil case where it states, 
. . . The statements of the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha ') on a matter related to 
the shari 'a are not granted any sanctity or placed beyond review or 
reexamination. Rather, they can be replaced by other [interpretations of Islamic 
law]. Opinions based on ijtihad in debated questions do not in themselves have 
any force applying to those who do not hold them. It is not permitted to hold 
[such opinions] to be firm, settled shari'a law that cannot be contravened. . . 
Perhaps the opinion with weaker support is the most appropriate of all [the 
competing opinions] for the changing circumstances, even if it [this weaker 
opinion] violates the settled and established opinions of the past!201 
 
This is very interesting when contrasted with how Shatibi perceives taqlid. According to 
him, the jurist should choose one of the doctrines (madhab) and chose a credible opinion 
from that madhab.202 In other words, according to Shatibi not only does the mujtahid or 
muqallid have to stick to one madhab, but even when performing taqlid, he should use 
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reason to choose the more “weighty” view. Shatibi, in his critique of the jurists of his 
time, attacks jurists who use legal stratagems (hiyal) by choosing the most convenient 
doctrines from the different schools in order to achieve results that are otherwise 
impossible within the boundaries of one school.203 The court clearly rejects to abide to 
Shatibi’s strict limitations on ijtihad. More importantly, the court here is not simply 
rejecting to follow/imitate the classical jurisprudence. However, it is a rejection of having 
to stick to a clear methodology, especially the classical doctrines because then the court 
would eventually succumb to the pressures of the Islamists. Thus, as much as the court’s 
statements are a rejection of Shatibi’s ijtihad methodology for the mujtahid to be able to 
follow his methodology of the inductive survey to identify different aims of the law that 
would match the new realities, they are also a rejection of being bound by a specific 
doctrine or classical methodology. Thus, the court makes sure to use the language of the 
classical jurisprudence while freeing itself from any adherence to the methodologies to 
which they entail.  
 
3. Maslaha  
It is very interesting to see how Shatibi conceptualized maslaha versus how Rida and 
accordingly the SCC conceptualize it and use it as a main tool in its jurisprudence. 
Shatibi, like Ghazali, saw that the ultimate goal (maqsud) of the Shari’a is for the benefit 
(maslaha) of the people.204 However, Shatibi elaborates on maslaha  by explaining that it 
is “intended to work for the benefit of man, but in a way that is determined by God, not 
man. . . it is defined by revealed law and not by “secular” or utilitarian need of man.”205 
This conception of maslaha is completely contradictory to the court’s conceptualization 
of maslaha in this excerpt: 
 
And whereas: Use of the rule of reason, where there is no [scriptural] text, 
develop practical rules (qawa 'id 'amliyya) that are, in their ramifications, gentler 
for the people and more concerned with their affairs and [that] better protect their 
true interests (masalihhim al-haqiqiyya). Legislative provisions seek to realize 
[such true interests] in a manner that is appropriate for [the people], affirming that 
the essence of God's shari'a is truth and justice. . .  
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As Brown and Lombardi have argued, maslaha stands as a pillar in the court’s mode of 
utilitarian reasoning, through which it comes up with new ruling when there is no certain 
text with respect to authenticity and meaning.206 However, the way in which is the court 
defines a maslaha would be under Ghazali’s category of al-masalih al-mursala or 
scripturally unregulated benefits. However, as discussed earlier, a maslaha of that kind is 
accepted if it can be proven to promote a universal goal of the Shari’a, and in order to 
prove that it promotes a universal goal, the jurist has to go through a detailed inductive 
survey of the different sources and prove that there is sufficient evidence from the 
scriptural that attest to this one theme protected under a universal goal or principle. This 
is different from how the court defines a maslaha purely according to reason rather than 
he scriptural sources. Thus, according to the classical theory, of maslaha, the way in 
which the court is identifying the maslaha deviates from both Ghazali and Shatibi’s 
methodologies. However, the court, through its reiteration of maslaha  as the basis its 
issuance of a new ruling or performing ijtihad does not follow a specific methodology 
like that of Ghazali, where there are no restrictions on how they identify a benefit and 
they reject one. Accordingly, by not following a clear methodology like the classical one, 
the court remains free of any shackles that could be imposed on it by the different 
political forces, especially the Islamists.  
 
4. Maqasid and Universal Principles   
The way in which Shatibi discusses the maqasid and universal principles is framed as a 
theoretical framework of inductive survey of different evidential material to identify 
goals (maqasid) and also the universal principles or universals (kulliyyat). The kulliyyat 
are simply fundamental principles that do not necessarily find attestation in the scriptural 
sources, however knowledge of these universals is “enshrined with certainty in the 
collective mind of the Muslim community as well as in the minds of Muslim 
individuals.”207 In other words, a universal principle is made up of various particulars 
(juz’iyyat) which all attest to one theme or value that is represented in that universal.208 
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For instance, Ghazali’s five categories of the maqasid (the protection of life, religion, 
mind, property, and progeny) which are a sub-category of his first category of necessities 
are considered universal principles.209  It is also important to note that the process of 
inductive corroboration of a wide variety of evidence is what gives legal theory or more 
explicitly the theory of the “roots of the law” (usul al-fiqh) its certainty; where it is 
grounded on a large body of evidence that might consist of many probable particulars but 
certainty is found through the common theme in all the different pieces of evidence.210  
On the other hand, substantive laws, known as the branches of law (furu’), are based on a 
limited number of particular pieces of evidence.211  
In light of the previous discussion of Shatibi’s maqasid methodology, the 
following discussion will tackle how the SCC conceptualizes the maqasid, how it defines 
a maqsid or a universal principle, and whether the rulings show any patterns of a 
methodology that it follows to reach its conclusions of what constitutes a maqsid or 
universal principle. In the Mut’a case, the court used the maqasid when stating that, 
It is necessary that ijtihad occur within the frame of the universal roots of the 
Islamic Shari’a (al-usul al-kulliyya li-‘l shari’a al-Islamiyya) . . . building 
practical rulings and, and in discovering them, relying on the justice of the 
Shari’a, [and] expecting the result of them to be a realization of the general goals 
of the Shari’a (al-maqasid al-‘amma li-‘l Shari’a), among which are the 
protection of religion, life, reason, honor and property.212 
 
The method which the court specifies  in order for their rulings to realize the goals of the 
Shari’a is vague and superficial, where what it states technically means that when they 
perform ijtihad in the realm of the universal roots of the Shari’a, relying on its justice, 
they will then expect the ruling to protect the five categories of Ghazali (with the 
substitution of honor instead of progeny). The first question that arises from this passage, 
with the conception of the universal principles in mind is: What is the court’s conception 
of ijtihad done in the universal roots of Shari’a? According to Shatibi, “the major 
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constituents of legal theory, such as consensus and public interest, are made up of 
universal principles.”213 Thus, notions of consensus and pubic interest have become 
sources/roots of the law due to the universal principles that have been found, through the 
corroborative survey, to support such concepts to become constituents of legal theory. 
However, it is vague, and even incoherent, to add “universal” to the “roots of the 
Shari’a”, where it is unclear what the court means. In other words, the universals, or 
universal principles, here are like a sub-category of the roots of the law, where they are 
the evidence that prove or support that consensus for example is a source of law. Thus for 
the SCC’s statement of “ijtihad [to] occur within the frame of the universal roots of the 
Islamic Shari’a” to be coherent, it should have omitted the word “universal”, where their 
statement would be much clear implying that their ijtihad should be based/framed on usul 
al-fiqh or simply the (theory of) sources of the law, where Shafi’i and also Shatibi and 
Ghazali have all agree on them being the Qur’an, Sunna, qiyas, and ijma’, which the court 
clearly refuses to strictly adhere to.   Thus, the term “universal” here is somehow 
irrelevant and misguiding, where its use in this statement mixes up different concepts of 
the theory of the roots of the law. This, however, demonstrates how the court employs the 
language of the classical theory, sometimes in an incoherent manner, even when it does 
not to adhere to the theories from which it adopts such concepts. Accordingly, it 
communicates to the Islamist dominated audience that it is abiding by the classical 
jurisprudence. 
Another interesting passage from the Veil case regarding universal principles 
states that, 
 
It is not permitted for a legislative text to contradict those shar'i rulings that are 
absolutely certain with respect to their authenticity and meaning (al-ahkam al-
shar'iyya alqat'iyya fi thubutiha wa dalalatiha), considering that these rulings 
alone are those for which ijtihad is forbidden, because they signify [the Islamic 
shari 'a's] universal principles (mabadi 'aha al-kulliyya) and its fixed roots 
(usulaha al-thabita), which accept neither interpretation nor substitution. . . And 
accordingly, it is unimaginable that the understanding of [such rulings] would 
change with a change of time and place. They cannot be amended. It is forbidden 
to contravene them or twist their meaning.214 
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The fact that the court states that rulings that are absolutely certain texts with respect to 
authenticity and meaning signify the Shari’a’s universal principles is another misguiding, 
incoherent and inconsistent statement, where, as discsused above, the universal principles 
are part of the usul al-fiqh while the rulings (certain or not) are part of the furu’ or 
substantive law. Thus, this statement not only mixes up premises of legal theory with 
substantive law, but it is alos inconsistent with other part pf the same case where the 
court identifies general goals, also considered universal goals by Shatibi and Ghazli, in 
which it adds modesty as will be shown below, which is a form of amendment or twisting 
of the meaning. In addition as mentioned in the maslalih mursala section, a principle can 
be found in new contexts to be of universality if there is enough evidence to support it. 
Thus, the court is inconsistent and incoherent  in its language and methodology. 
 
 The next interesting point in this passage is: Why did the court exchanged 
Ghazali’s progeny with honor? Adding honor to the five categories of Ghazali is a 
minority opinion amongst classical jurists.215 What is interesting here is that this case was 
the case of custody and alimony (mut’a), and thus it would make more sense if the 
concept of progeny was perceived as one of the goals that the ruling would protect. 
Again, in this case it is unclear why the court did so and there are no indicators in this 
case that would suggest that the court wanted to convey something through this choice of 
words. However, it shows that the court is not consistent and careful in its use of the 
maqasid, even in the very limited and inconsistent way in which it uses it.  
In another instance however, in the Veil case, the court puts a significant notion, 
modesty, in its conception of the maqasid, where the court states,  
 
It [ijtihad] must pursue methods of reasoning out the rulings (alahkam) and 
binding supports (al-qawa 'id al-dabita) for the branches of shari'a (furu 
'iha),guarding the general goals of the shari'a (maqasid al-'amma 1i al-shari'a) so 
that religion, life, reason, honor/modesty, and worldly goods are protected.216 
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The court here adds modesty to the universal principles of Ghazali. An interesting 
question that arises from such addition is whether the court is thus considering modesty a 
universal principle? In other words, the five categories of Ghazali are considered both 
necessities and universals. It is interesting to point that Shatibi actually sees that people’s 
customary and daily practices, including clothing, are intended to preserve the maqsid of 
life, and thus in this case clothing, and modesty, are particulars that are subsumed under 
the protection of life.217 The following passage is a significant part of the Veil case in 
which it its survey of the various related evidence of women’s dress.  
It cannot be concluded from this that a woman's dress falls among those matters 
of piety that cannot be altered. Rather, so long as they do not contradict an 
absolutely certain [scriptural] text, the wali al-amr has absolute authority to 
legislate practical rules within its/their boundaries, limiting the form of [a 
woman's] attire or dress in light of what prevails in her society among the people 
so that it is appropriate with their traditions and customs. Indeed, its content 
changes according to time and place. As long as the covering realizes the 
conception, the dress of the woman shall be considered an expression of her 
belief. And whereas: the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha') disagreed among 
themselves in the subject of the interpretation of Qur'anic texts and of what has 
been transmitted from the Prophet in the form of strong and weak hadiths.218 
 
Although the court states that it performed some form of an (inductive) survey of the 
scriptural texts and of the different opinions of the classical jurists when it states that, it is 
highly probable that it meets Shatibi’s criteria of the inductive corroborative survey to 
identify a goal. Moreover, modesty cannot be a one of the universal goals, or general 
goals as they are referred to, because it lacks the universality aspect which is the fact that 
it should be applicable and targeting to all Muslims and not benefit a segment. Here, 
modesty is clearly targeting women only, and it is not a benefit that is being protected, 
where in this case the court is imposing its interpretation of modesty and endorsing it in 
the state apparatuses. Thus, the court is affirming that a woman’s attire is not only not her 
personal choice, but rather affirms that the legislator has the right to limit her choices 
regarding her choice of dress. Moreover, the fact that modesty is used by the court as a 
general goal of the Shari’a demonstrates how the court communicates placates the 
conservative Islamist audience for whom the issue of the dress of the woman was 
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becoming an integral one. Thus, although the court ruled in favor of the ministerial 
decision (the secular forces of the state) and banned the niqab in schools, it managed to 
frame its ruling in a way that maintained the outlook of respect for the conceptions and 
methodologies of the classical jurisprudence, especially the maqasid theory. Accordingly, 
the terminology of the maqasid theory were highly employed by the court in its rulings as 
a tool of mediation between the secular state apparatus and the militant Islamists in order 
to maintain its power pass its different political choices. Thus, the court, while 
challenging the state apparatuses, also maintained not to be subsumed under the umbrella 
of the Islamists and bind itself to any theory (the maqasid) or methodology that would 
limit its interpretation of what constitutes Shari’a. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the maqasid al-Shari’a doctrine was the classical theory that was 
developed to escape the curbing forces of the tradition, abuses of the law, and to meet the 
needs of changing contexts. However, as any other utilitarian theory, it carried the stakes 
of threatening the tradition by uncontrolled subjectivity and discretion. The maqasid 
classical theorists, especially Shatibi, articulated a methodology and theory through 
which the jurist would be able to induce the aims of the law in order to meet new contexts 
or challenges. In other words, although Shatibi was developing a utilitarian tool, which he 
knew would allow for more subjectivities, he also clearly articulated who and how could 
embark on the use of it. 
 However, with modernization and colonialization, and the perceived need by 
Islamic reformers to reform the Shari’a in order for it to correspond to the new contexts, 
the maqasid was revived and reintroduced as the new compatible methodology for the 
twentieth century by Rashid Rida. However, with Rida prescribing the maqasid to be 
used without any of the classical limitations, he offered the secular trained legalists a 
methodology that would serve as their most efficient tool to use reason. Thus, Rida, when 
propagating Shatibi’s theory and methodology of maqasid was unfaithful to it by only 
taking the part that allowed for utilitarian reasoning and completely disregarding the 
whole framework and limitations in which such type of reasoning was intended to 
function.  
 Moreover, the endorsement of the maqasid by the different influential religious 
figures, especially Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the propagation of the concept as the 
classically sound methodology that would allow Islamic law to meet the needs of 
Muslims in the modern contexts. Accordingly, by introducing the maqasid doctrine to the 
public, Islamists included, as an inherently classical and coherent methodology of 
applying Islamic law, it could be argued that Qaradawi familiarized the audiences, 
specifically Islamists in Egypt, with the whole maqasid rhetoric, that the SCC would start 
employing in the 1990’s. 
 
As a result, in the SCC’s ‘Golden Age’,when the court starts elaborating on its 
interpretation of Article 2, it used the maqasid and its terminology to issue its 
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interpretation which was different from what the Islamists had expected. In other words, 
the maqasid functioned as the perfectly appropriate tool for the court to pass its political 
choices under a seemingly authentic and credible Islamic methodology. Thus, when the 
Islamists had predicted the court to follow the classical Islamic jurisprudence, the court 
offered them an understanding of Article 2 that left a lot of discretion in the hands of the 
judges meanwhile it affirmed that its use of reason and not following the classical 
jurisprudence is inspired by the classical, authentic theory of maqasid. Accordingly, the 
SCC, emptying the maqasid theory of all its constituents and limitations put forth by the 
classical jurists, used it as tool for the mediation between the opposing secular 
government and militant Islamists. Finally, in the use of maqasid by the SCC, there were 
both elements of continuity and change, as Hallaq argues about law in general.219 The 
maqasid as a classical theory continued be perceived as the authentic method of using 
reason and getting away with the rigidity of the law, while it changed by all its endorsers 
such that it matched their agendas. 
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